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Baseball might be the American pastime, but by time spent, there 
is no activity that Americans spend more time doing than driving.1  
Americans love their vehicles, and long-distance driving through 
suburban and exurban sprawl is a marker of the American lifestyle.2  
From the early days of the Ford Model T, through the driving heyday of 
the 1950s and 1960s, to the electric and self-driving cars of today, the 
automobile has had a defining influence on American culture.3  While 
Americans may value the freedom of the open road, they nonetheless 
accept basic traffic regulations to ensure safety.  Such laws usually 
dictate how one drives—how fast, how orderly, or how one must prove 
their abilities before receiving a driver’s license.  Most people likely 
believe that those laws may not dictate where or how much one drives 
on public roads.4  Despite this perception, legislators have implemented 
statutes and ordinances with the purpose of restricting where and when 
drivers may proceed on public roads.5  Despite the potential for 
legislative overreach, the outcry in response to these rules has been 
tepid, with questions as to their constitutionality rarely raised before 
courts.6 
In 2017, the town of Leonia, New Jersey, instituted a municipal 
ordinance which barred drivers who neither live nor work in Leonia 
from driving on its public roads during rush hour, ostensibly to limit 
gridlock to the George Washington Bridge.7  This law follows a long 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 1  Steven N. Gofman, Car Cruising: One Generation’s Innocent Fun Becomes 
Another Generation’s Crime, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 30 (2002). 
 2  Id. at 31. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. at 3-4. 
 5  Id.  
 6  Id. 
 7  Steve Janoski, Leonia’s Ban on Commuter Traffic Along Local Roads: Is It 
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tradition of statutes enacted to limit undesirable drivers on public streets 
at undesirable times.8  The Third Circuit has held that when  reviewing 
statutes limiting intrastate travel, as opposed to the more frequently 
discussed interstate travel, courts must apply intermediate scrutiny.9  
Intermediate scrutiny requires that an important government interest be 
addressed through means, such as a statute, that are substantially related 
to that interest.10  This note will argue that while the history of so-called 
“cruising” jurisprudence or caselaw concerned with the rights of drivers 
to drive aimlessly on public roads—does grant municipalities some 
degree of discretion to limit intrastate travel, this statute likely fails 
intermediate scrutiny.11 
The concept of “cruising” has a long history in American culture, 
and imagination.12  Depicted in many famous films like American 
Graffiti, groups of young Americans have, for years, gathered in their 
vehicles, driving aimlessly through town together.13  “Cruising” has 
been defined as: 
A social phenomenon primarily involving 20th Century American 
youth owning or having access to automobiles, and essentially 
consists of the practice of driving slowly around a set ‘loop’ of 
streets in an urban area, especially during evenings, weekends, or 
other free time, and frequently entails talking between 
automobiles at stoplights, stopping randomly to greet 
acquaintances on the street, or engaging in like activities causing 
congestion and delay for those with legitimate business in the 
area.14 
In practice, the act of cruising has led to both ample celebration and 
detraction.15  Supporters assert that cruising is “a rite of passage 
celebrating freedom, adulthood, and the authority to drive a car.”16  
Detractors allege it leads to increases in crime, drug dealing, 
 
Legal?, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 25, 2018, 6:18AM), https://www.northjersey.com 
/story/news/bergen/leonia/2018/01/25/leonia-ban-commuter-traffic-local-roads-
legal/1059993001/. 
 8  Gofman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 9  Gofman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 10  Gofman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 11  Gofman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 12  Gofman, supra note 1, at 6. 
 13  Gofman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 14  Russell G. Donaldson, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes or 
Ordinances Forbidding Automotive “Cruising”—Practice of Driving Repeatedly 
Through Loop of Public Roads Through a City, 87 A.L.R. 4th 1110 (1991).  
 15  Gofman, supra note 1, at 4. 
 16  Gofman, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Nesreen Khashan, State Street Cruiser a 
Loser; Court Rejects His Constitutional Appeal of Traffic Ticket, SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 2000, at B3). 
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prostitution, gang activity, and traffic infractions, as well as more 
mundane effects, such as congestion and traffic gridlock.17 
I. BACKGROUND AND CASE LAW 
The town of Los Gatos, California was among the first 
municipalities in the nation to enact a cruising ban in 1980.18  In doing 
so, the town defined cruising as: 
Driving a motor vehicle on a highway (1) for the sake of driving, 
without immediate destination, (2) at random, but on the lookout 
for possible developments, or (3) for the purposes of (a) 
sightseeing repeatedly in the same area, and (b) while driving with 
the purpose of socializing with other motorists or pedestrians.19 
The ordinance prohibited this activity in the central business district of 
the town.20  The law was struck down several years later, largely on 
procedural grounds, as a result of substantive California state law 
governing municipal lawmaking.21  The constitutionality of the ban was 
not addressed.22  Nonetheless, this early attempt to define and prohibit 
aimless driving set the tone for future municipal ordinances—especially 
those distinguishing “social” and “repetitive” forms of driving from 
ordinary driving.23 
The hallmark case addressing the constitutionality of limiting 
drivers on public roads is Lutz v. York,24 a case decided by the Third 
Circuit in 1990, just a decade after the Los Gatos ordinance was struck 
down.  The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue 
substantively.25  In this case, the Third Circuit reviewed a statute passed 
by the city of York, Pennsylvania prohibiting aimless driving in a 
certain part of the city at night.26  Somewhat differently from the Los 
Gatos statute, this statute defines “unnecessary repetitive driving”—as: 
Driving a motor vehicle on a street past a traffic control point, as 
designated by the York City Police Department, more than twice 
in any two-hour period, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 
a.m. The passing of a designated control point a third time under 
the aforesaid conditions shall constitute unnecessary repetitive 
 
 17  Gofman, supra note 1, at 4. 
 18  Gofman, supra note 1, at 9. 
 19  Gofman, supra note 1, at 9. 
 20  Gofman, supra note 1, at 9. 
 21  Gofman, supra note 1, at 10. 
 22  Gofman, supra note 1, at 10. 
 23  Gofman, supra note 1, at 10-11.  
 24  899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. at 257. 
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driving and therefore a violation of this Ordinance.27 
The ordinance passed the city council at the behest of the local police 
department, fire department, and other municipal emergency service 
personnel.28  Legislative findings concluded the ordinance should be 
passed so as to: 
[R]educe the dangerous traffic congestion, as well as the excessive 
noise and pollution resulting from such unnecessary repetitive 
driving, and to insure sufficient access for emergency vehicles to 
and through the designated city thoroughfares now hampered by 
this repetitive driving of motor vehicles.29 
The York Police Department asserted that traffic caused by cruising 
creates traffic at levels worse than during rush hour.30  The York Fire 
Department argued that this traffic “standstill” creates a danger to town 
safety, with emergency vehicles unable to proceed through town easily 
during nighttime hours.31  The fire chief testified that “seconds, not even 
minutes,” are critical to town safety, creating a strong government 
interest in regulating traffic.32 
The plaintiffs in Lutz challenged the ordinance on the grounds that 
such a statute violates their constitutional right to travel and that the 
ordinance is overbroad.33  The lower court did not conclude the 
ordinance violated a right to travel, because it found that precedent only 
created a “liberty interest” in intrastate travel, and not a “fundamental 
right.”34  Therefore, rational basis scrutiny was applied, and the interests 
provided by York was found constitutionally sufficient.35 
In reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Third Circuit sought to 
examine all possible constitutional grounds upon which a fundamental 
right to localized intrastate travel could be based.36  The Circuit Court 
determined that Supreme Court precedent firmly guarantees a 
fundamental right to interstate travel.37  In Shapiro v. Thompson,38 the 
Supreme Court struck down durational residency requirements as a 
prerequisite to obtaining welfare benefits on Equal Protection grounds, 
 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. at 257-58. 
 29  Id. at 257. 
 30  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 257. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 258. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262. 
 37  Id. at 258. 
 38  394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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because the law distinguished long-time local residents from local 
residents who had moved between states.  This holding meant that 
residents have the right to travel between states and relocate temporarily 
or permanently to other states without being treated differently by local, 
state, or federal law.39  After the holding in Shapiro, the Supreme Court 
broadened its scope, holding, among other things, that minimum 
durational residency requirements may not be used to establish 
eligibility to vote or to receive free non-emergency medical care.40  
Although these cases illustrate a strong regard for freedom of 
movement, the Third Circuit found that they do not address the 
Constitution’s requirements for intrastate travel.41 
The Third Circuit did, however, find that the Supreme Court 
previously referenced a constitutional right to freedom of movement.42  
In Kolender v. Lawson,43 the Supreme Court examined an anti-loitering 
statute.  The Kolender Court struck the statute down as vague, focusing 
mainly on the lack of adequate notice provided in the text.44  However, 
the Third Circuit noted that the dicta suggested “‘a constitutional right 
to freedom of movement’ potentially implicated by the statute.”45  
Likewise, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,46 which also 
addressed an individual’s challenge to a municipal anti-loitering statute, 
the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s inclusion of a number 
of poems and works of literature mentioning wandering and walking as 
“part of the amenities of life,” indicate an acknowledgment of freedom 
of movement.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the statute 
discriminated against the poor and declined to address the issue of 
freedom of intrastate travel.47  The Third Circuit concluded that it could 
not find direct justification for a right to localized intrastate travel in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence; therefore, it considered other 
constitutional grounds.48 
First, the Third Circuit examined the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to see if it could justify a fundamental right to 
localized intrastate travel.49  The Court examined a very early case, 
 
 39  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618). 
 40  Id. at 259. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)). 
 44  Id. at 260 n.8. 
 45  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 260 n.8 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). 
 46  Id. (quoting Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972)). 
 47  See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171 (1972). 
 48  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262. 
 49  Id. 
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Corfield v. Coryell,50 which recognized the right to travel and work out-
of-state under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  In that case, the 
dicta noted that: 
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in, 
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional 
pursuits, or otherwise . . . may be mentioned as [one] of the 
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which [is] clearly 
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be 
fundamental . . . .51 
This dicta implied the creation of a right to travel both through and 
within a state; however, subsequent precedent held that the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not, itself, create rights.52  
Likewise, the Third Circuit found that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause is also inapplicable because it does 
not independently create rights.53  Similarly, the Third Circuit found that 
the Supreme Court had already refused to recognize a right to travel as a 
right of citizenship in United States v. Wheeler,54 holding it only 
applicable when a law impedes a citizen’s ability to travel to exercise 
the rights and duties of citizenship.  Additionally, the Third Circuit 
found that the Commerce Clause does not establish the right to freedom 
of localized intrastate travel, as the ordinance in Lutz did not facially or 
in effect burden the interstate flow of commerce.55  Finally, the Third 
Circuit found that the Equal Protection Clause did not establish such a 
right because the statute did not define groups or distinguish between 
groups; rather, the ordinance barred certain actions on public roads.56 
Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined that the Due Process 
Clause established a fundamental, substantive right to localized 
intrastate travel.57  The Court located dicta in early due process cases 
implying a right of intrastate travel.58  For example, in Williams v. 
Fears,59 a case decided in 1900, the Supreme Court found that “the right 
of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according 
to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty . . . secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”  Likewise, a separate line of cases from 
 
 50  Id. (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825)). 
 51  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
 52  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)). 
 53  Id. at 264. 
 54  Id. at 264-65 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920)). 
 55  Id. at 265. 
 56  Id. at 265-66. 
 57  Id. at 266. 
 58  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266. 
 59  179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). 
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the 1950s and 1960s concerning the question of whether the federal 
government may constitutionally deny passports to Communists also 
implied a broad due process right to travel.60  In Kent v. Dulles,61 the 
Supreme Court held that “[t]he right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of 
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under 
the Fifth Amendment.”  Although this statement implies that the 
Supreme Court interpreted a right to travel as an important—and 
perhaps fundamental—right, the Third Circuit nevertheless found that 
the Supreme Court focused its holding directly on the issues of freedom 
of association.62  Subsequent case law muddies this understanding, with 
some cases—such as Haig v. Agee63—upholding restrictions on 
international travel while distinguishing those restrictions from a 
general constitutional right to interstate travel within the United States.  
Because interstate travel is specified in Haig, the Third Circuit 
concluded that drawing a constitutional right to localized intrastate 
travel from this line of cases would be difficult.64  The court 
subsequently concluded that “no constitutional text other than the Due 
Process Clauses could possibly create a right of localized intrastate 
movement, and no substantive due process case since the demise of 
Lochner has considered whether the clause in fact does create such a 
right.”65 
Therefore, the court applied the test “usually articulated for 
determining fundamentality under the Due Process Clause,” which asks 
whether the right must be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” or 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”66  The court also 
weighed, and ultimately adopted, Justice Scalia’s understanding of the 
Due Process Clause, holding that it protects “unenumerated rights ‘so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”67  Using this standard, the court concluded that the right 
to free intrastate movement—by vehicle or on foot—is “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in the Nation’s 
history.”68  Therefore, the Court recognized that a fundamental right to 
 
 60  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266. 
 61  357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). 
 62  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266. 
 63  Id. at 266-67 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)). 
 64  Id.  
 65  Id. at 267. 
 66  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). 
 67  Id. at 268 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)). 
 68  Id. 
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localized intrastate movement exists.69 
However, the Third Circuit was uncomfortable reviewing this 
fundamental right under strict scrutiny, which is customary for putative 
violations of due process rights.70  Additionally, the court recognized 
that if strict scrutiny applies to the York statute, it would plainly fail, as 
the ordinance does not constitute the least restrictive means of 
preventing traffic problems.71  Instead, the court analogized the 
fundamental right to localized intrastate movement to the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.72  Just like freedom of speech 
jurisprudence permits reasonable, content-neutral and limited time, 
place, and manner restrictions on speech, the court held that time, place, 
and manner restrictions are necessary and reasonable for regulated 
intrastate movement as well.73  Therefore, the Third Circuit held that 
this fundamental right should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, 
with an eye toward ensuring that ordinances are “narrowly tailored to 
meet significant city objectives.”74  Under this reading, the court found 
that York’s ordinance constituted an appropriate use of the city’s police 
power, and that the ordinance was narrowly tailored enough to pass 
constitutional muster.75 
In the aftermath of the Lutz decision, challenges to statutes 
regulating cruising or other aimless driving met with mixed results, both 
within and outside of the Third Circuit.76  The only major success came 
outside of the Third Circuit in the Minnesota state Court of Appeals.77  
In a Minneapolis suburb, an ordinance was passed prohibiting “driving 
three or more times in a designated no-cruising zone between 9:00 p.m. 
and 2:00 a.m.”78  Citing Lutz extensively and reviewing under 
intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the ordinance was not 
narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster, and that it constituted an 
unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right to intrastate 
movement.79  The court specifically looked to the legislative findings 
 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id. at 269. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 270. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22. 
 77  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 906-
10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 78  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 906-
10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 79  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10). 
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behind the ordinance’s passage—claims regarding increased fighting, 
traffic violations, drug dealing, and other criminal activity—and found 
that all of them were already flatly prohibited by state and local law.80  
Therefore, the new anti-cruising ordinance is not narrowly tailored to 
address the alleged problems.  The court found that “there [was] no hole 
in the Minnesota Criminal Code for this cruising ordinance to plug.”81  
This conclusion implies that narrowly tailoring an ordinance to solve an 
important government interest necessitates some prior loophole or clear 
shortcoming of existing legislation.82  Layering new statutes on top of 
existing statutes does not meet the standard necessary to pass 
constitutional muster.83 
Following the ruling in Lutz, courts within the Third Circuit put the 
holding framework into action in subsequent cases, determining what 
government interest is important enough to pass the bar under 
intermediate scrutiny.  In Snowden v. State,84 the Supreme Court of 
Delaware applied the test set out in Lutz to a criminal case.  Here, the 
defendant Snowden was convicted of stalking for repeatedly following 
and calling a coworker and was sentenced to two years probation.85  
Two years later—after the no-contact order expired—the defendant 
again began following the victim.86  The defendant conducted his 
stalking by assessing the location of the victim and then following her 
driving at a short distance along public roads.87  After several 
occurrences, the defendant was again arrested and convicted.88  Among 
several other arguments on appeal, the defendant contended that the 
anti-stalking statute under which he was convicted violated his 
constitutional right to localized intrastate travel—a fundamental right 
per Lutz.89  Snowden claimed that the anti-stalking statute 
unconstitutionally prohibited free travel on public roads and that his 
arrest and conviction was for his exercise of this constitutionally 
protected right to drive where he pleased on public roads—regardless of 
whether that was where the victim was also driving at the same time.90 
 
 80  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10). 
 81  Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).  
 82  Gofman, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10). 
 83  Gofman, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10). 
 84  677 A.2d 33 (Del. 1996). 
 85  Id. at 35. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 35-36. 
 89  Id. at 36. 
 90  Snowden, 677 A.2d at 37. 
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The court rejected Snowden’s argument.91  Although the court 
conceded that under the Lutz precedent localized intrastate travel along 
public roads is indeed a constitutionally protected right, it found that the 
governmental objective of protecting individuals from stalking and 
other harassing behavior was sufficient to pass intermediate scrutiny as 
an important state interest.92  The court held that the interest of 
“preventing the emotional harm to individuals caused through fear and 
loss of privacy, as well as the more general societal interest in fostering 
a sense of security” constituted an important government interest, and 
statutes to this effect will be held constitutional.93  Likewise, the court 
found that the regulated behavior in this statute does not bear a strong 
burden on any exercise of the right to localized intrastate travel because 
its limitations on travel do not extend to “unintentional [travel] or . . . 
travel serv[ing] a legitimate purpose.”94 
Looking outside the Third Circuit, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Missouri has also examined the issue of 
localized intrastate movement.95  In Townes v. City of St. Louis, the 
court examined a city ordinance that temporarily closed a public street 
for a period of six months.96  The ordinance passed as an emergency 
measure at the request of local residents, who claimed that excess traffic 
through the street brought negative effects on quality of life, including 
increased criminal activity.97  The residents and the city aldermen 
supporting the ordinance believed a temporary end to traffic would help 
“stabilize” the street and surrounding neighborhood, and thus reduce 
crime.98  The ordinance was enforced by the deployment of several 
large flower pots along the road’s entrance from the nearest avenue.99 
The plaintiff—a resident of the street—challenged the 
constitutionality of the ordinance, alleging, among other things, that it 
violated her substantive due process right to localized intrastate travel 
along a public street to access her residence.100  On the other hand, the 
city contended that no such right existed, as this jurisdiction is outside 
the Third Circuit, and the ruling in Lutz did not apply.101  The court 
 
 91  Id. at 38. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 96  Id. at 733. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 734. 
 101  Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 734. 
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examined the holding in Lutz, as well as Eighth Circuit precedent 
regarding substantive due process, and concluded that the Eighth Circuit 
would most likely not establish the same holding as the Third Circuit.102 
Nonetheless, the court decided to review the St. Louis ordinance 
under intermediate scrutiny to determine whether it passes muster.103  In 
the city’s favor, the court considered how minimal the effects of the 
ordinance are on area residents.104  The flower pots did not shut off all 
routes to the street, and slightly longer alternative routes still existed.105  
Likewise, the ordinance left access to other government services—such 
as fire protection, police, and emergency services—unchanged.106  In 
sum, the court found that the plaintiff was at best “marginally 
inconvenienced” by the ordinance.107  On the other hand, the court 
examined the proffered government interest underlying the ordinance—
the apparent proliferation of crime along the effected street.108  The 
plaintiff contended that the appropriate response to the government 
interest in stopping criminal activity is calling for a police response or 
increased police activity—not inconveniencing area residents.109 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court found that “the existence of 
this alternative method of dealing with the criminal activity in the 6100 
block (e.g., increased police patrolling) may be relevant as a limitation 
on the authority of the city to act, if the court was required to subject the 
ordinance to strict constitutional scrutiny.”110  Therefore, were this case 
governed by Third Circuit precedent, intermediate scrutiny would not 
have been met, and the ordinance would likely be found 
unconstitutional.111  However, the court rejected its earlier argument 
supporting intermediate scrutiny, determining that in the Eighth Circuit 
this level of scrutiny is not yet necessary.112  As such, the court then 
applied the rational basis test of constitutional scrutiny.113  Under this 
test, a statute must only be rationally related to a government interest to 
pass constitutional muster.114  This is a low bar, and courts generally 
 
 102  Id. at 735. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 736. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 736. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 736. 
 114  Id. 
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only strike statutes if they are so irrational as to “shock the 
conscience.”115  Under the rational basis standard of review, the 
ordinance easily passes, as reducing crime is a government interest and 
reducing traffic is rationally related to achieving that goal.116  The court 
specifically states the reported result of the ordinance’s implementation, 
finding that a showing of reduced crime furthers the notion that the 
ordinance was rationally related to the stated outcome.117  Therefore, the 
plaintiff’s claim of unconstitutionality under substantive due process 
grounds fails.118 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina—outside of the Third Circuit—has also examined a statute 
under the test presented in Lutz.119  In Shanks v. Forsyth County Park 
Authority, a county parks authority enacted a resolution banning entry 
of motorcycles into a public park.120  The plaintiff was an avid 
motorcyclist who attempted to enter the park on his motorcycle to 
participate in a charity ride event.121  In addition to other constitutional 
claims, the plaintiff alleged that an ordinance banning motorcycle entry 
violated his substantive due process right to localized intrastate travel.122  
Although not required to follow the precedent set in Lutz, the court 
nevertheless quoted the holding and test positively and examined the 
circumstances of the case as if bound by Lutz.123  Recognizing a 
fundamental right to localized intrastate movement, the court found that 
the resolution banning motorcycle entry passed constitutional muster 
not because it passed intermediate scrutiny, but rather because it did not 
implicate any right of movement at all.124  The issue is avoided for two 
main reasons.125  First, the court distinguished a right to travel to the 
park versus a right to travel around the park.126  This regulation only 
implicates the right to travel around a set area, not the right to travel to a 
place.127  Second, the court distinguished a ban on entry generally from 
 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Shanks v. Forsyth Cnty. Park Auth., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C. 1994). 
 120  Id. at 1233. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 1237. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. at 1238. 
 125  Shanks, 869 F. Supp. at 1238. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. 
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a ban on entry via the means of a motorcycle.128  If a fundamental right 
to localized intrastate movement along publicly accessible property 
exists, then that right is satisfied by entry or transit through a means of 
movement—not necessarily through every means.129  As such, a 
government entity may determine which means are appropriate for 
movement in a particular area.130  Here, the court found that the plaintiff 
could easily get off his motorcycle and enter the park on foot, by 
bicycle, or through other permitted means, satisfying his right to 
movement and entry.131  Taking these two factors together, the court 
found that the resolution did not implicate the constitutional right to 
localized intrastate travel.132 
Returning to Third Circuit jurisdictions, the issue of localized 
intrastate travel was most recently examined in two New Jersey cases.  
The first of which, Lanin v. Borough of Tenafly,133 was decided by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs reside on a street shared by a school.134  The Borough of 
Tenafly promulgated ordinances making the street one-way during 
school hours, eliminating on-street parking, and constructing a student 
drop-off zone along the street.135  The plaintiffs alleged, in part, that 
their substantive due process rights to localized intrastate travel had 
been violated by the ordinances because the newly increased and 
irregular traffic patterns force them to change and delay their regular 
travel routes.136  The court dismissed these claims, finding that 
“[t]raffic, even if it can be attributed to poor public planning, is not a 
deprivation of a fundamental right.”137  Likewise, the court found that 
“tak[ing] a route that turns out to be more circuitous when viewed from 
the perspective of a particular property owner’s driveway” does not 
constitute a deprivation of a fundamental right.138  According to the 
court, to violate the constitutional right to localized intrastate travel, a 
burden must actually prevent travel—not simply render it more difficult 
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or inconvenient.139  This lack of a describable burden is especially 
important relative to the compelling government interest in maintaining 
a school premises.140 
The issue came up again in Galicki v. New Jersey,141 which was 
also decided by the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  The events in Galicki concern a high-profile political scandal in 
which state officials allegedly ordered some points of access to the 
George Washington Bridge closed to punish disloyal local political 
figures.142  Among numerous other claims, the plaintiffs in this case—
made up of local residents and commuters angered by the delays caused 
by the closures—asserted a violation to their fundamental substantive 
due process rights to localized intrastate travel.143  Decided after Lanin, 
both plaintiffs and defendants tailored their response to conform to the 
recent holding holding.144 Plaintiffs argued that, short of simply 
inconveniencing their commute, the closures amounted to a total denial 
of access to many routes—trapping some at home.145  On the other 
hand, the defendants likened plaintiffs’ grievances to those of the 
plaintiffs in Lanin—anger about a slight inconvenience or somewhat 
longer commute but not sufficient enough to amount to a significant 
burden.146  The court distinguished this case from Lanin because of the 
defendants’ intent in each case.147  In Lanin, the defendant borough 
sought to ease traffic congestion to a school—a laudable government 
interest.148  In this case, the defendants allegedly exacted the closure out 
of spite.149  Because the intent behind the alleged planned closure was 
vindictive in nature and designed to delay or divert commuters, the 
court found that no government interest existed to justify the closure.150  
As such, the closure amounted to an unconstitutional violation of 
commuters’ rights to localized intrastate (and interstate) movement.151 
 
 139  Lanin, No. 2:12-02725 (KM)(MCA), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *26. 
 140  Id. 
 141  No. 14-169 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126076 (D.N.J. Sep. 15, 2016). 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at *42. 
 144  Id. at *46. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Galicki, No. 14-169 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *46. 
 148  Lanin v. Borough of Tenafly, No. 2:12-02725 (KM)(MCA), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 256 at *26 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2014). 
 149  Galicki, No. 14-169 (JLL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *46. 
 150  Id. at *49. 
 151  Id. 
MRAKOVCIC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2019  2:53 PM 
2019] A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL 377 
II. ANALYSIS 
The ordinance passed by the municipality of Leonia sought to bar 
drivers who are not residents of Leonia or employed at a location in 
Leonia from driving through the municipality during rush hour.152  
Local residents and employees would be marked so as to allow them to 
pass without being stopped.153  Applying the above cases to the Leonia 
ordinance does not provide a clean-cut answer to the question of 
whether this ordinance passes constitutional muster. Nevertheless, a 
court would likely hold the ordinance unconstitutional.  As Third 
Circuit precedent governs in New Jersey, it is worth examining the 
ordinance under Lutz first, as this test is the one a court must apply.  
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, Leonia would have to 
demonstrate that keeping vehicles out serves an important government 
interest and that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve that stated 
objective.154  Managing traffic flow during rush hour would most likely 
constitute an important government objective, just as general traffic 
flow management was recognized as an important objective in Lutz.155  
Likewise, Leonia can demonstrate that traffic leading to the George 
Washington Bridge renders rush hour traffic particularly disruptive and 
in need of government intervention.156  However, the Leonia ordinance 
is likely not the most narrowly tailored option to achieve the goal of 
limiting congestion.  First, keeping all outside drivers off the road—
regardless of their origin, destination, or the duration of their drive 
within Leonia—represents a major inconvenience to drivers from 
neighboring towns, and a clear windfall to Leonia residents.  In Lanin, 
the holding states that taking a more circuitous route is not a deprivation 
of a fundamental right; however, Galicki modified that holding to 
include more deference to intent and effect.157  Here, it appears Leonia’s 
intent in promulgating the ordinance was neutral—a simple desire to 
help its own residents.  However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that 
Leonia sought to help its own residents to the exclusion and detriment 
of the residents of neighboring towns, then the ordinance would fail 
constitutional scrutiny as not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 
The regulation in Shanks is distinguishable from the Leonia 
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ordinance.  There, the regulation barred entry of a particular mode of 
transit through a public park.158  Here, a broader ban exists on all motor 
vehicles entering a municipality.  The court in Shanks established that a 
right to intrastate localized movement constitutes movement by a means 
to a publicly accessible location, not necessarily around one.159  Here, 
travel to points in Leonia is entirely barred to non-residents during rush 
hour, unless traveling by foot or other non-motorized transport. This 
restriction is significantly more burdensome on travelers than the park 
regulation, necessitating a much more drastic change in mode of 
transportation to reach a destination in Leonia.  Therefore, it seems 
unlikely a court would weigh the holding in Shanks as relevant to the 
Leonia ordinance. 
In Townes, the Court concluded that a blocked street did not 
constitute a violation because of an important government interest.160  
However, if the court had applied intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance 
would have been struck down as overly broad.161  Other methods of 
addressing the issue—such as increased police activity—amounted to 
more narrowly tailored solutions to the proffered governmental 
interest.162  Here, the town of Leonia has numerous potential options to 
address congestion issues, short of a total ban. For instance, the town 
could—taking a cue from the City of York in Lutz—just prohibit both 
Leonia residents and outsiders from excessively repetitive driving 
around Leonia during rush hour. The court in Lutz held that such a 
regulation is constitutional, and it amounts to a less restrictive means 
than a total ban.163  According to city planning experts, Leonia could 
also pursue less restrictive means by changing the layout and flow of 
some of its more congested routes—governmental functions broadly 
within its police powers and far less restrictive than the total ban.164  
Under this reading of intermediate scrutiny—although not holding 
precedent—the Leonia ordinance must also fail. 
On the other hand, proponents of the Leonia ordinance could 
argue—per Lanin and Snowden—that the municipality simply seeks to 
protect its residents’ safety and well-being.  Were a court to find that 
safety is the main interest behind the ordinance like in Snowden, the 
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ordinance could pass intermediate scrutiny.165  The distinctions between 
Snowden and the Leonia ordinance are vast—one seeks to prevent 
harassing and potentially violent behavior, whereas the other addresses 
traffic.  Nevertheless, if a court were to draw a line between the two 
cases, a challenger would perhaps find a greater likelihood of success 
challenging the law under other grounds—such as Equal Protection.  
Similarly, were proponents of the ordinance to draw from the case 
regarding the Minnesota ordinance directly succeeding Lutz, they could 
argue that unlike the case there, the important governmental need in 
Leonia is not addressed by already-existing law in any form—
necessitating a change. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Under the balance of case law, a court would most likely strike the 
Leonia ordinance as unconstitutional because the ordinance does not 
amount to a narrowly tailored solution to an important government 
interest. 
 
 
 165  Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 38 (Del. 1996). 
